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It has been 6 months since the World Health Organiza-tion (WHO) officially declared the global outbreak ofsevere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) to be under
control. Since then, public health officials involved in the
SARS outbreak, be it clinicians, epidemiologists, laboratory
scientists, outbreak management teams or politicians, have
turned to extensive introspective analyses. Important
lessons can be learned from these evaluations in the event
that SARS reappears or outbreaks of new and emerging in-
fections occur.
In this issue (page 47), Patrick Tang and colleagues, par-
ticipating in the Ontario Laboratory Working Group for
the Rapid Diagnosis of Emerging Infections, report on
their experience with the laboratory investigation of SARS
during the outbreak in Toronto.1 They point out the diffi-
culties encountered within the diagnostic laboratories and
the continual changes in the options that were available to
them. During the first weeks of the outbreak no diagnostic
tests were available, but later, when the first generation of
molecular assays and serologic tests became available, addi-
tional problems arose, such as the absence of a “gold stan-
dard” for the tests, the lack of uniformity of the tests (i.e.,
how they were conducted and which primer sets were
used), and the lack of information on which specimens to
collect from patients and how to collect them. Despite
these problems, the authors have conducted detailed retro-
spective analyses of the laboratory data collected during the
outbreak in Toronto and have put them in context with the
available clinical and epidemiological data. After all, when
it comes to an outbreak such as this one, it is better to draw
careful conclusions from imperfect data than to draw no
conclusions at all.
The main conclusion of their study is that the evaluation
of the clinical presentation and the elucidation of a contact
history must remain the cornerstone of SARS diagnosis,
which is in keeping with recent WHO recommendations
and with medical practice in general.2 Because the tests
available to detect the SARS-associated coronavirus
(SARS-CoV) are not sufficiently sensitive to identify early
infection — when transmission of the virus may already be
occurring — cases need to be identified using alternative
(clinical and epidemiological) strategies.
To this end, the case definition of SARS has recently
been updated, in part to help distinguish the illness caused
by SARS-CoV from atypical pneumonia caused by other
pathogens.2 Molecular diagnostic tests, such as reverse-
transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), amplify
minute quantities of viral RNA and thus may help to detect
SARS-CoV early in the course of illness. Molecular tests
may also be useful in clinical and epidemiological investiga-
tions of clusters of infected patients. However, at present,
neither negative results nor single positive results of molec-
ular tests can be considered conclusive for the detection of
SARS-CoV. In Tang and colleagues’ study, even after re-
peat testing with RT-PCR, only 54% of the patients for
whom diagnostic test results were available had a positive
result. In addition, as pointed out by the authors, the pres-
ence of other pathogens, such as Mycoplasma pneumoniae
and Chlamydia pneumoniae, does not exclude the possibility
of coinfection with SARS-CoV. The role that these and
other pathogens, such as human metapneumovirus, may
play in SARS still needs to be determined.
In the Toronto outbreak, the peak positivity rate of
RT-PCR occurred 9 to 11 days after the onset of symp-
toms, which is similar to the late peak of virus titres ob-
served in clinical specimens collected from patients in the
Hong Kong outbreak.3 Stool samples and samples col-
lected from the lower respiratory tract appeared to be the
best choice for sampling because they yielded the highest
detection rates. The authors recommend that sputum and
stool samples be the preferred type of specimen obtained
for RT-PCR because their collection does not require in-
vasive procedures, which may increase the risk of nosoco-
mial infection.4
As with all serologic tests available to identify infectious
diseases, those used to detect SARS-CoV antibodies are
primarily useful retrospectively because the antibodies
reach detectable levels later in infection. The first genera-
tion of serologic tests appear to give consistent results for
samples from patients in Toronto and elsewhere, and they
now provide a powerful tool to identify or confirm SARS
cases retrospectively. In the series reported by Tang and
colleagues, convalescent serum samples were positive in
96% of the patients from whom paired samples were col-
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lected. Thus, the current serologic tests may be a good
“gold standard” for new or improved diagnostic tests to de-
tect SARS-CoV early in the course of illness in a largely
seronegative population. Poon and colleagues5 recently
developed a second-generation RT-PCR assay capable of
detecting SARS-CoV in up to 88% of respiratory tract
samples obtained within the first 3 days after illness onset
in confirmed SARS cases in the Hong Kong outbreak. In
addition, they showed that the viral load is unusually low
early in the course of SARS, as compared with the viral
load in other respiratory illnesses. This provides a plausible
explanation for the poor detection of SARS-CoV in early
samples using the first-generation RT-PCR assays.
The push is now on to design even more sensitive tests.
Most of the current RT-PCR tests for SARS-CoV are de-
signed to detect the replicase gene of the virus, because this
was the first gene identified. Perhaps alternative target gene
sequences such as the nucleocapsid gene may yield more
sensitive tests. The nucleocapsid protein coats the viral
RNA and is more abundant than the replicase protein in
CoV-infected cells and virus particles. This is because
coronaviruses rely in part on a transcriptional gradient, in
which nucleocapsid messenger RNA (mRNA) is more
abundant than mRNA encoding the replicase protein.
Since some coronaviruses can also package this nucleocap-
sid mRNA in virions,6 it is worth investigating whether
RT-PCR assays based on the nucleocapsid gene are more
sensitive than those based on the replicase gene.
Second-generation tests using alternative PCR tech-
nologies are being tested in a large number of laborato-
ries — institutional, regional and national — in order to
prepare for the possible return of SARS. However, it is un-
likely that such diagnostic tests will significantly affect the
current strategies for outbreak management.2 As empha-
sized by Tang and colleagues, it is important that there be
an integrated system of institutional, regional and national
diagnostic laboratories in order to respond effectively and
rapidly to outbreaks caused by new and emerging infec-
tious diseases and that the communication and cooperation
between physicians, epidemiologists and laboratory scien-
tists be optimized. The creation of a Canadian Agency for
Public Health, as recommended by the National Advisory
Committee on SARS and Public Health,7 would respond
effectively to this challenge and bring Canada in line with
other highly developed Western countries. Diagnostic lab-
oratories are very important in the early recognition of
emerging pathogens and in the development and improve-
ment of diagnostic tests. When incorporated in the out-
break management network from bedside clinicians to
politicians, the diagnostic laboratories indeed can play a
crucial role in outbreak control, as was shown during the
recent global SARS outbreak.
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